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After more than eighty years as a part of Colombia, the Republic of 
Panama declared its independence on November 3rd, 1903.1 To this day, 
the memory of this loss continues to haunt Colombian historiography. 
When analyzing the Panama controversy, Colombian historians and 
political scientists tend to agree on the fact that this was one of the most 
important events in Colombian history. However, their reasons for 
attributing such importance to Panama’s secession differ; some focus on 
the strategic territorial loss, while others highlight the change it incited in 
Colombian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the immediate loss of revenue, 
as well as the economic chaos and restructuring that affected the 
Colombian government, are two of the few facts around which there is 
an established consensus.  
Another point of agreement is that the United States’ economic 
hegemony played a fundamental role in the separation of Panama from 
Colombia and furthermore, that this intervention was an imperialist act. 2 
I hope to unsettle the latter. Although it is tempting – and certainly not 
out of fashion in the popular press – to present Colombia as the victim 
of U.S. imperialist ambitions, this view is problematic in certain respects.3 
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Analyzing U.S.-Colombian relations and their consequences through an 
anti-imperialist lens takes away agency from the smaller actor and 
obscures other consequences of Panama’s secession. The role of the 
United States is certainly a force that has shaped Colombia’s history; 
however, it is not the only one, and I would argue, not the most 
important one when it comes to the aftermath of Panama’s secession. 
Panama’s separation did more than bring economic doom and 
political shame to Colombia. The political and economic consolidation of 
the Colombian nation-state were facilitated by this international incident. 
To explain this assertion, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of 
what nation state means. In fact, a critical reading of Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism provides a helpful 
framework with which to analyze the development of the nation and 
nationalism that is essential to understand the Colombian situation. 
Although Anderson’s analysis is helpful, when applied to Spanish 
America, it has a major shortcoming: it fails to account for the intra-
national economic divisions that became problematic later on as the new 
republics tried to consolidate their power. A look at what became of 
Bolívar’s Gran Colombia is enough to realize that vice-royal territorial 
divisions, print capitalism, and a sense of otherness are not enough to 
account for Spanish-American state formation. Even as a smaller political 
unit, Colombia still struggled to become a ‘nation’ and to create a strong 
state. The most salient example of this state of affairs is the Panamanian 
secession, which proved just how weak the Colombian nation-state was 
until that point.  
It is equally important to highlight several key aspects of the 
politico-economic situation in Colombia between 1810, when it first 
attempted to gain independence, and 1902, which marked the end of 
Colombia’s last civil war. This is necessary in order to demonstrate that 
there were more important factors at play, other than U.S. imperialism, 
which contributed to Panama’s separation. At this point, the role of the 
United States in the conflict will be considered to present a holistic 
picture of Panama’s secession in 1903. Once this has been established, 
the aftermath of Panama’s secession will be analyzed, beginning with 
Rafael Reyes’s presidency in 1904 and culminating with the ratification of 
the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty in 1921. The treaty settled any pending 
issues between Colombia and the United States regarding Panama’s 
secession. In this last section, the paper intends to demonstrate the 
strengthening of the ‘nation-state’ both as a result of economic 
development that was national – rather than regional – in scope and of 
nationalist political rhetoric that U.S. intervention prompted. With this in 
mind, I hope to reset the traditional anti-imperialist narrative given that 
its limited scope renders it inadequate for any analysis of the 
consequences of Panama’s secession. By presenting Colombia solely as a 
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victim of empire, Colombian historiography obscures, perhaps 
intentionally, the way in which the centralist Bogotá elite used the 
aftermath of the secession to finally consolidate its power. 
   
Inside Colombia: 1810-1902 
 
With a history of territorial disconnect and internal conflicts, 
Colombia as a fragile whole had not confronted the changing continental 
economic reality – increasingly dominated by the United States – until 
Panama’s secession in 1903. Throughout the 19th century, the Colombian 
political landscape was characterized by civil war and internal strife as 
members of the Liberal and Conservative parties competed for the 
control of national politics.  
In order to demonstrate just how fragmented Colombia really 
was, it is important to talk about a period that historians have come to 
identify as la Patria Boba (the Foolish Fatherland). Traditional Colombian 
historiography identifies the Patria Boba as the period between 1810, 
when Colombia first declared its independence, and 1816, when the 
Spanish led a temporarily successful effort to re-conquest.4 This period is 
identified as ‘foolish’ because of the fact that during those four years, 
internal squabble within neo-Granadine territory did not permit the 
formation of an organized resistance to maintain independence. 
According to David Bushnell, the situation was somewhat inevitable 
given New Granada’s topography and the distribution of its population. 
He maintains that, “geographic separation thus came to reinforce all the 
basic socioeconomic and cultural differences among major regions, and 
the result was an intense sectionalism that vastly complicated the first 
efforts at political organization.”5  
One must pay careful attention to the denomination of the 
conflict within the territory of New Granada as ‘sectionalism.’ As such, it 
implies a certain unity that has been broken, or sectionalized, and this can 
been used as a tool to justify the existence of the Colombian nation. This 
is evident in Bushnell’s work when he speaks of the “internal disunity” 
that led New Granada to declare independence in a “piecemeal fashion,” 
meaning that different provinces declared independence at different 
times, culminating with the establishment, in 1811, of a “general 
government of sorts under the United Provinces of New Granada.”6 This 
traditional history creates a scholarly body of work that traces the 
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existence of the Colombian nation to the very beginning of the wave of 
independence movements that swept across Spanish America. It is 
equally important to note what this history does not do: it does not 
mention that the rivalry within the different provinces in the Viceroyalty 
of New Granada was caused by forces greater than topography alone. As 
historian Alfonso Múnera points out, Foolish Fatherland is an all-
inclusive term that implies the false notion that the internal disunity 
within what today is Colombia was a result of the inexperienced elite that 
led the independence movement.7  
The misleading nature of the concept becomes clear when one 
considers that during the Patria Boba, the governing junta of Cartagena 
de Indias – arguably one of the most important commercial and military 
centers of the Spanish Empire – established the independent Republic of 
Cartagena of the Indias, wishing to remain autonomous from Bogotá (in 
the province of Cundinamarca).8 A closer look at the differences between 
Cundinamarca and Cartagena – and the subsequent conflict between 
them – is essential to understand the regionalism that has been such a 
salient characteristic of Colombian history. With disparate economic 
realities and dissimilar social make-ups, the early dispute between 
Cartagena and Cundinamarca marked the beginning of Bogotá’s long and 
arduous nation-building mission.  
One of the most important contributing factors to the 
opposition between Cartagena and Bogotá was the distinct nature of their 
economies. Because of its location in the Caribbean, Cartagena served as 
one of the busiest ports in Spanish America.9 The Cartagena merchant 
elite organized the Commerce Consulate of Cartagena, which advocated 
for free trade in the Caribbean Sea and pushed particularly for trading 
wheat flour from the United States. The Caribbean elite’s economic 
project was a direct threat to the economic growth of Bogotá and its 
surroundings. As an important agricultural center, this region of 
Colombia cultivated wheat and other staples. Cartagena’s project would 
jeopardize the relative economic stability of the Andean region.10 Thus, 
the conflict that emerged between Bogotá and Cartagena during the 
period of independence was not a result of simple political inexperience 
but rather the clash between two regions with distinct economic priorities 
that necessitated different policies.  
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Society too proved to be an important barrier for the integration 
of these two regions. Cartagena was a crucial port for the importation of 
African slaves and this led to the development of a population that was 
heavily made up by people of African descent. This was in sharp contrast 
with Cundinamarca, where the population was more homogeneous and 
the majority of inhabitants were the descendants of Spaniards.11 In 
Cartagena, racial mixing eventually gave birth to a prominent mulatto 
merchant class. Political activity there was “dominated to a great extent 
by mulattos and negroes” whose freedom within the new political order 
was guaranteed.12 This, however, did not sit well with the ideological 
currents of the time, when people of color were seen as inferior and 
many argued that tropical climates were not conducive to the 
development of civilization.13 Political leaders in Bogotá were very 
outspoken about their disdain, referring to mulattos and blacks in the 
Caribbean coast as savage and undisciplined. Thus, it should not come as 
a surprise that the inhabitants of the province of Cartagena were so 
determined in their mission to maintain autonomy. In Múnera’s terms, 
“Cartagena’s independence effectively eradicated the possibility of 
peacefully integrating both provinces under one nation.”14 Both 
provinces remained independent from each other until the Spanish dealt 
a decisive blow from which Cartagena never truly recovered. Bogotá 
opted to let the province fall to make it easier to impose control from the 
Andean capital.  
Unlike traditional historiography maintains, the Colombian 
nation was not truly a nation since its beginning. The ruling classes of 
several provinces had very different projects in mind that, as 
demonstrated, pitted those within the ‘nation’ against each other. 
Cartagena and Bogotá were by no means the only provinces with 
differing economies and societies. Nevertheless, theirs is an iconic 
example of the pervasive disunity that has characterized a significant 
portion of Colombia’s history. By 1821 – only a few years after the Patria 
Boba – an army led by Simón Bolívar managed to liberate all of the 
Viceroyalty of New Granada, which included modern-day Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and the Mosquito Coast in present-day 
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Nicaragua.15 The Province of Panama later issued a decree by which it 
officially joined Gran Colombia, Bolívar’s dream republic. Recall the 
‘piecemeal’ fashion with which Bushnell described Colombia’s 
independence. This stands in sharp contrast with the notion espoused by 
some Colombian historians that Panama was an organic part of 
Colombia.16 Since writing a history is a crucial endeavor for the creation 
of a nation-state, the existence of such narratives is not unexpected. 
However, it is certainly surprising that one hundred years after Panama’s 
secession, some historians continue to promote the notion of a 
Colombian nation-state beyond the borders of the current one. 
  The Gran Colombian experiment went ahead, with internal 
disunity and regionalism making an appearance once again. With a 
weaker Cartagena, the protagonists of this second clash were the elites of 
Bogotá and Caracas as the engineers of independence sought to create a 
unified political entity out of the newly liberated territory.  
Despite great efforts to set up this new republic, Gran Colombia 
was doomed since its official establishment in 1821 by the same debate 
between federalism and centralism that affected present-day Colombia 
throughout much of its history. Under the authority of Francisco de 
Paula Santander, Gran Colombia underwent a series of liberal economic, 
educational, and religious reforms. Discontent throughout Ecuador and 
certain sections of Venezuela caused by those reforms precipitated a 
constitutional convention during which Venezuelan General Antonio 
Páez declared Venezuela’s independence, followed shortly by Ecuador.17 
The resulting constitution was approved only in the provinces of New 
Granada and Panama. They went on to write yet another constitution in 
1832, when the Republic of New Granada was officially established. 
The republic of New Granada was divided into sixteen provinces 
that largely obeyed the territory’s topography. The difficult topography 
and the precarious state of the economy made it extremely difficult to 
move from one province to the other. In some cases, it was even difficult 
to move within provinces.18 Even with fewer regions to worry about after 
Gran Colombia’s disintegration, the Neo-Granadine state struggled to 
maintain its hold over a vast territory that was not easily navigable. 
Flirtation with federalism kept alive the provincial hopes of a more 
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autonomous government that would allow each one of the provincial 
elites to pursue their interests. In this newly established Republic of New 
Granada, one could speak of the existence of the Colombian state only 
because of the constitution.  
Economic integration proved even more difficult. The provinces 
in the interior continued to be distinct from those in the Caribbean where 
(instead of agriculture) trade was the means of subsistence. Given the 
difficult topography of the nation, the Republic of New Granada was 
more of a collection of provinces rather than a unified state. Because of 
the poor state of the economy, the state had basically no means with 
which to actively enforce and oversee the creation of a stronger state. 
The nation was conspicuous by its absence. 
The period between the creation of the Republic of New 
Granada (1832) and the separation of Panama from the Republic of 
Colombia in 1903 show this. Within this timeframe, the fragile State 
experienced seven civil wars and two name changes, a situation so grave 
that it resulted in the temporary secession of provinces like Cauca and 
Panama, among others.19 After its final and deadliest civil war, The 
Thousand Day’s War (1899-1902) centralism became, once and for all, 
the underlying premise of the Colombian state. This structure would also 
become that of the nation.20  
As evidenced by this overview of the ninety-two years 
encompassed between 1810 and 1902, the Colombian state was 
characterized by its weakness and its consistent inability to maintain the 
central government’s authority vis-à-vis the differing interests of its 
provinces. The end of the Thousand Days’ War, showed the vulnerability 
“of the concept of a Colombian nation, with a political system that did 
not have the capacity to negotiate the most urgent problem of the 
country’s international agenda: devising a treaty whereby the United 
States acquired the rights to build, through Colombian territory, a canal 
that would join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.”21 This demonstrates that 
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the concept of a Colombian nation-state did not exist since the first 
declarations of independence in 1810. Furthermore, the problems of 
integration faced during the Patria Boba and again during the existence of 
Gran Colombia, albeit nuanced, exhibit a certain degree of thematic 
continuity. The relative geographic isolation of each province made it 
difficult to undertake a nationalizing project, exacerbated by the lack of 
government revenue. The role of historians in creating the Colombian 
nation-state needs to be emphasized once again. Throughout the years, 
they have provided the country with a history of unity that, as 
demonstrated, was not the case. Many of the works were quick to blame 
the United States and failed to recognize that the state was not very 
present in Panama, and that there were many other factors that were (at 
best) problematic in order to maintain Panama as a part of Colombia. 22  
 
Global Geopolitics and Panama 
 
The Province of Panama did not prove easier to integrate into 
the Andean republic, whatever its name was. In fact, before it declared its 
independence once and for all in 1903, the province had already 
entertained the idea four times. The last attempt, in 1840, lasted a year, 
after which the commercial elite agreed – under the promise of greater 
independence to set economic policy – to be a part of the Republic of 
New Granada.23 Panama’s population and weather were not very 
different from that of Cartagena. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
rulers in Bogotá were not too preoccupied with the province itself if one 
keeps in mind the social ideologies previously discussed. 
Panama did not represent much, economically or socially, for the 
government in Bogotá. During its brief period of independence in 1840, 
Panama had approached Great Britain with the hope to either become a 
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part of the British Empire. Although Panama’s elite later integrated the 
province back into New Granada, the idea of a possible British intrusion 
did not sit well with Santander’s government in Bogotá.24 This led 
Santander to search elsewhere in a preventive effort to protect New 
Granada’s sovereignty.  
Serendipitously, the United States was expanding to the West, 
thereby making transit through the isthmus a necessity as it exploited the 
mineral resources in California.25 A treaty with New Granada proved 
most convenient. First of all, passage through the isthmus would 
significantly cut the distance traveled by sea to the West Coast (the 
alternative was around Cape Horn). Second, U.S. engagement in the 
region would check the ambitions of the British. It was this set of 
circumstances that led to the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty of 1846. Through 
this treaty, the Republic of New Granada granted the United States 
significant transit rights over the isthmus. In exchange, the United States 
was to guarantee New Granada’s sovereignty and property rights over the 
isthmus as well as its political neutrality.26 This treaty was the start of the 
stormy relationship between Colombia and the United States that ended 
in a highly publicized international incident. 
The negotiations between New Granada and the United States 
worried a British Empire that still had Caribbean ambitions. It was in the 
spirit of avoiding future confrontation over such a crucial waterway that 
the United States and Great Britain signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 
whereby they agreed that undertaking the building of a canal would only 
be considered as a joint enterprise between the two powers.27 The 
strategic position of Panama had become evident to the largest world 
powers.  
Two events in 1869 clearly showed for the united states of both 
Colombia and America that a canal must be built through the isthmus. 
First, there was the completion of the transcontinental railroad in the 
U.S.; this dealt a devastating blow to the isthmian economy that had, up 
until then, depended on the transit of Americans and their merchandise. 
The Colombian government realized that a canal had to be built to 
restore economic prosperity to the region. The second event was the 
completion of the Suez Canal; the United States government was newly 
determined to build a canal through the isthmus that would not only 
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facilitate American expansionism but also keep British economic rise in 
check; or at least compete with it.28 In order to justify its constant – and 
sometimes unwanted – interventions in Colombian territory during the 
many civil wars, the United States used the clause of the Mallarino-
Bidlack Treaty that called for the United States to maintain the neutrality 
of the isthmus. The Colombian government was eager to renegotiate a 
treaty in order to avoid further unwanted intervention. Renegotiation 
attempts failed, and the lack of a new agreement meant maintaining a 
status quo that the Colombian government was no longer willing to 
accept; it sought France as an ally. However, the French enterprise failed 
and that, coupled with a British Empire focused in Asia, left the United 
States as the only nation with enough capital to build the canal as well as 
the desire to build a hemispheric economy that rivaled that of Britain. 
The interest of the United States in the canal became even greater in 1898 
when the U.S. acquired Guam, the Philippines, and Hawaii.29 Because 
Great Britain had a vested interest in total control of the Suez Canal, it 
was not difficult to renegotiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with the 
United States. This meant that negotiations between Colombia and the 
U.S. could start.30 The treaty that resulted from these negotiations was 
the Hay-Herrán Treaty, which granted the United States rights over a 
zone of the isthmus to build the canal. One of the most controversial 
stipulations of that treaty was that it granted the U.S. perpetual rights 
over the canal zone. This, among other things, led the Colombian 
government to reject the treaty, a measure that the Panamanian elite, the 
Frenchmen, and Theodore Roosevelt did not appreciate. The secessionist 
voices in Panama became louder, arguing that as a part of Colombia 
Panama was economically doomed. A confluence between French 
entrepreneurial interests, Panama, and Roosevelt’s resolve proved 
stronger than Colombia’s sovereignty and on November 3rd, 1903, just a 
year after the end of the Thousand Days’ War, Panama declared its 
independence. The Colombian government sent troops to put down the 
rebellion but the Panama Railroad Company refused to transport them to 
the other side of the isthmus.31 Two days after the secession, the U.S. 
government recognized the new republic and a treaty quickly granted the 
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After Panama's Separation: The Birth of Columbian Nation-State, 
1904-1921 
 
Until Panama’s secession, Colombia had maintained a colonial 
infrastructure that was adequate for a colonial economy of imports and 
exports rather than for fostering a unified national market.32 Although it 
is not certain whether or not this concern was already being discussed by 
the government before Panama’s secession, its aftermath provides ample 
evidence that Colombian leaders wanted to focus on reshaping the 
economy in order to establish a strong state. Rafael Uribe Uribe, a 
notable Colombian general and intellectual, observed that: 
 
“Without a squadron, without an army, without industries, and without 
 diplomacy, we lack all that is necessary to ensure that a country is heard 
 in the international arena. It can almost be said that such a country 
 loses the moral right to autonomy in the midst of countries that are 
 strong and civilized.”33 
 
The words are harsh, but they show that he, like many others in the 
government in Bogotá, were aware of Colombia’s challenges in the 
international arena. Sparked by Panama’s secession, the central 
government knew that it had to take action in order to prevent other 
provinces from following Panama’s example. The changes that Colombia 
underwent from 1904 to 1911 were crucial for the creation of the nation-
state that the Bogotá elite had longed for. 
Starting with President Reyes in 1904, the national government 
undertook reforms that, although modest, were veritable efforts to build 
a strong state and the capacity to build an imagined community (or at the 
very least, prevent the secession of other provinces). During his 
presidency, Reyes aimed to empower the central government and build a 
national economy at the expense of the regional economies that fractured 
the state. One of the first things he did was change the way in which 
public administrators were selected. For the first time, Reyes required 
that the candidates show expertise in the area of policy that they expected 
to be a part of. Another move to expand the power of the central 
government was the nationalization of the slaughter tax. His government 
also sought to stabilize Colombian currency, which suffered an inflation 
rate of 2,500 percent. This effort to maximize the government’s solvency 
was undertaken partly to finance an infrastructural expansion. The 
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process of funds allocation for public infrastructure, mainly railroads and 
roads, was also streamlined to give more power to central government.34 
In a country prone to civil war, it is perhaps unexpected to see the 
implementation of such centralist reforms. Indeed, it is worth noting that 
these reforms encountered resistance from many who did not wish to see 
their regional autonomy reduced. However, the majority of congress 
agreed to Reyes’ reforms because they were aware that if something was 
not done, secessionist tendencies in other parts of the country could 
become a reality. Reyes went farther than expected, dividing certain 
departments in order to prevent the concentration of power at the 
regional level, which led to the disruption of traditional regional 
allegiances.35 Finally, a central bank was re-established in order to regulate 
the fragmented monetary markets that existed in the country.36  
Reyes recognized that the economic resources with which to 
carry out infrastructural reform were limited. Therefore, he also took 
steps to ensure that Colombia was once again attractive to foreign 
investment. Among other things, he resumed service of Colombia’s 
foreign debt, and accepted most the creditors’ demands. Although 
Reyes’s dictatorial powers were controversial, his decision to negotiate a 
treaty with the United States for the loss of Panama was even more 
polemical. He was aware that normalizing relations with the United States 
would open Colombia once again to American investment. However, 
Reyes encountered insurmountable opposition with regards to this, and 
by 1909 he had to leave office.37 Although his presidency was slightly 
unconventional, in the words if historian Darío Mesa, “Reyes explained 
Colombia’s problem as two-fold: first, building the material foundations 
of the modern State to then exercise as much State sovereignty as those 
foundations permitted.”38  
Though implementing reforms motivated by Panama’s secession, 
Colombian government officials rarely discussed the incident.39 One 
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historian has noted that, “paradoxically, after Panama’s separation, the 
governing elite was more interested in allowing the incident to fall into 
obscurity… They opted instead for silence, promoting a subtle national 
amnesia with regards to that subject.”40 The silence was broken in 1911 at 
the University of California, Berkeley, where ex-president Roosevelt 
made controversial remarks that brought the Panama incident to the 
center of the international spotlight. In his speech, Roosevelt asserted, “I 
took the Canal Zone, [my emphasis] and let Congress debate, and while the 
debate goes on the canal does also.”41 Roosevelt also wrote an editorial 
for The Outlook in October 7, 1911 in which he described Colombia as 
“utterly incompetent to perform the ordinary governmental duties 
expected of a civilized state,” described its government officials as “a 
succession of banditti,” and further justified his actions by claiming that 
the U.S. “did harm to no one save as harm is done to a bandit by a 
policeman who deprives him of his chance of blackmail.”  The 
controversial public conversation that ensued was not very consequential 
in the sense that it did not help Colombia regain lost territory. However, 
the controversy did have a very important effect: it was a factor that 
helped legitimize – nationally and internationally – the existence of a 
Bogotá-led Colombian nation-state that had struggled to exist for almost 
a century but was now well on its way to building a strong state. Partially 
because of Panama’s separation, several key political differences were 
resolved, leading to a peaceful period in which capitalism expanded 
largely due to coffee exports.42 The humiliation of losing national 
territory made it evident to Colombian politicians that internal strife 
could lead to more territorial loss, and that was a price they were no 
longer willing to pay. 
Panama’s separation represented a flagrant disregard for 
Colombian sovereignty and a significant loss of revenue. As expected, 
Colombian government officials rushed to qualify Roosevelt’s remarks as 
an imperialist affront. Francisco Escobar, the Colombian Consul-General 
for the United States, immediately wrote a letter to Roosevelt which was 
published by the New York Times and other newspapers. Although 
certainly scathing towards Roosevelt, certain passages provide us with a 
glimpse of the complicated relationship between Colombia and the 
United States: 
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Sir: former presidents of the United States have stepped down from the 
 highest position attainable by mortal man to again become private 
 citizens of this great Republic, and have carried with them … the 
 dignity of their office and the respect of their fellow-countrymen. You 
 have elected a different course and … have forfeited the consideration 
 due to the high office you once held. You can now pretend only to 
 such respect as you as a man deserve. I say this to make it quite clear 
 that I am addressing you as an individual, and do not wish to reflect 
 either upon the Government or the people of the United States, for 
 whom I have the deepest respect and regard … 
In default of argument, such is the unseemly language [presented 
 above] you use to justify the rape of the Isthmus and refute the oft-
 repeated charges that you deal unfairly with Colombia; that you violated 
 a public treaty [Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty] … as to permit your friends 
 who were interested in the Panama Canal Company to put through 
 their $40,000,000 deal … that you prostituted the navy of the United 
 States to the same end … You hurl insults and slanders at the 
 unfortunate country that you robbed of her most valuable 
 possession… 
 
In the introduction, Escobar takes care to make it clear that he is 
insulting Roosevelt and not the government of the United States. 
However, it is important to keep in mind the reforms that the Colombian 
government was trying to achieve. Although President Carlos Restrepo 
was now in power, he was just as committed as Reyes to continue 
strengthening the Colombian state. The fiscal reforms encouraged by 
Reyes did create more revenue, but the expansion of the national 
infrastructure envisioned by the president still required foreign 
investment. The weight of this consideration is evident in the consul’s 
letter. By explicitly stating that he does not mean to insult the U.S. 
government, he is avoiding detrimental consequences for Colombia’s 
relationship with the United States.  
Another salient characteristic of Escobar’s letter is the language 
with which he victimizes Colombia. In addition to referencing rape, he 
speaks of Roosevelt’s unfair treatment towards Colombia, which is 
described as an unfortunate victim of robbery.  Based on the state of the 
Colombian economy, the country did not have the means to go to war 
against the United States. The only option left was to take the United 
States to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and allow international law 
to do justice by the “raped republic.” The United States never agreed to 
arbitration. Under those circumstances, there was little that the 
Colombian government could do but assimilate its loss. 
Despite the fact that Colombia did not recover its territory, one 
must be careful to not dismiss the consequences of the 1911 debate. In 
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fact, a New York Times editorial read, “Why arbitrate a dispute as to 
which any just tribunal would certainly find against us? … There are a 
great many people of the United States who would like to be able to look 
South America in the face without blushing.”43 Together with the 
strengthening state, the international recognition of Colombia’s 
complaint legitimized the Colombian nation both to its inhabitants and 
around the world. The United States – partially seeking to ameliorate its 
image in Latin America and partially seeking to exploit Colombia’s 
coffee, oil, and other agricultural goods – sought to normalize relations 
with Colombia in 1914. This effort was welcomed by Restrepo’s 
administration. In the resulting Thompson-Urrutia Treaty, Colombia 
would agree to recognize Panama’s sovereignty in exchange for $25 
million in compensation, the right to transport its military through the 
canal, and the right to transport commercial goods through the canal 
subject to the same fees as the United States.44 
Before the U.S. government was able to ratify this treaty, World 
War I started and American participation delayed its ratification. The 
Thompson-Urrutia Treaty was finally ratified in 1921, which brought a 
much-needed cash injection to Colombia. The fact that Colombia had 
access to the canal drastically altered economic patterns in its Pacific 
coast and the Valle del Cauca regions. Here, coffee exports benefited 
relations with the U.S., because access to the canal meant quick access to 
the American markets.45 Additionally, transportation costs decreased 
further thanks to the new railroads funded by the Colombian 
government. This prompted the emergence of new economic patterns 
that, coupled with the other reforms, reduced economic regionalism in 
the country. 
The efforts to consistently attract American investments were 
motivated by both the desperate economic situation of the country and 
the desire to acquire enough economic capital to actually build a nation-
state. These efforts defined, for the first time, the foreign policy of the 
nascent Colombian nation-state. Given Colombia’s internal problems, its 
foreign policy was rather limited. It is true that there was commerce with 
Great Britain, the United States, and France, among others.46 However, 
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the most notable acts in the international sphere had to do with the 
Panama Canal, starting with the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty in 1846. It was 
then that the Colombian government started trying to organize its foreign 
policy.47 In fact, several political scientists of different backgrounds have 
identified Panama as the guiding factor of Colombian foreign policy 
citing that year as a starting point.48 However, it isn’t until Panama’s 
secession that an identifiable effort to build an organized foreign policy is 
conceived.  
This what political scientist Martha Ardila argues in ¿Cambio de 
norte? Momentos críticos de la política exterior colombiana. In her book, Ardila 
argues that Panama’s loss was a catalyst in Colombian foreign relations as 
there was an effort to organize a policy that was, up until then, poorly 
defined. Ardila argues that Colombia has been in a position that she 
terms “active subordination.” She characterizes the period from 1914 to 
1930 as a pragmatic effort to approach each other almost entirely for 
economic reasons: the U.S. looking for raw materials, Colombia for 
foreign capital with which to push forward its project to build a modern 
nation-state (proyecto modernizador del Estado).49 
This distinct form of Colombian foreign policy has been 
identified by Colombian academics as “réspice polum,” looking towards 
the North Pole. In her description of this period, Ardila maintains 
Colombia’s foreign policy in terms of an economic exchange – one where 
the United States has the economic capital Colombia needs to modernize. 
This reality drives foreign policy towards the northern neighbor. 
Although her analysis provides a helpful frame with which to understand 
this “opportunistic” view, it is narrow insofar as it excessively treats the 
State as an actor, which at some point lessens the responsibility of 
individual policy makers in Colombia. The policy of réspice polum was 
driven by the Bogotá elite that, as has been demonstrated, needed to 
build a nation-state. Additionally, the growing influence of the coffee 
producing elite, which would certainly benefit from an increasing 
relationship with the United States, was another factor driving the foreign 
policy decisions of Colombian presidents and diplomats.  
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Although Colombia’s access to the Panama Canal altered many 
of the regional economic patterns that were once damaging for national 
unity, the influence of exports on the nation’s economy was ever 
increasing. The coffee-growing elite had a growing influence in 
Colombia’s foreign policy as they looked to expand coffee’s international 
market. This displaced earlier regional conflicts with different economic 
dynamics within the country. The development of Colombia’s foreign 
policy can be seen as one more step towards the establishment of the 
Colombian nation, this time in the international arena. 
The period of 1904 to 1921 was crucial not only for the 
economic development of the state and a defined foreign policy but also 
for the development of the ‘model’ Colombian citizen. By 1903, Bogotá’s 
failure to create a nation-state was evident. Thus, the same time period in 
which the government oversaw the emergence of the Colombian state 
also oversaw the foundation of the nation. The ideology of the time 
viewed white as the desirable race. Panama, mostly inhabited by blacks 
and Native Americans, never really had a place in the national image of 
the Bogotá elite. Panama’s separation made Colombia slightly more 
homogenous, and thus easier to imagine as one nation. 50 Nevertheless, 
Colombian intellectuals continued to attribute part of the country’s woes 
to its racial make-up. In his book Fronteras imaginadas: la construcción de las 
razas y de la geografía en el siglo XIX colombiano, Alfonso Múnera describes 
the way in which the Bogotá ruling class envisioned the Colombian 
citizen. Citing a prominent Colombian intellectual, Múnera shows how 
the elite viewed Bogotá as the cradle for the best elements of civilization. 
This of course meant that the ideal Colombian citizen under Bogotá’s 
leadership was white and ‘civilized,’ a concept that marginalized other 
groups within the nation while at the same time forcing them to be a part 
of it.51 It was during this period of time that the image of the Bogotano 
prevailed in the Colombian imaginary as the ideal citizen, an idea 
reinforced by Bogotá’s increased dominance of the state since 1904. This 
is, once again, evidence of a silencing of sorts that served a nation-
building purpose.  
Given the historiographical trajectory of the nation state, it may 
seem surprising to hear historians like Gustavo Montañez say that, “the 
greatest loss from Panama’s separation was human, Panamanians 
themselves, whose talent, cultural diversity and potential is 
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unquantifiable.”52 On a superficial level, his statement represents the 
development of racial tolerance and appreciation for diversity that 
characterized the end of the 20th century. However, his work, one 
hundred years after Panama’s separation, is still reluctant to accept 
Panama’s loss. Indeed, he goes as far as suggesting that both countries 
should “owe each other a second chance and should start thinking about 
Colombia and Panama as one country.”53 This pervasive unwillingness to 
accept Panama’s separation as definitive speaks to a body of work that 




Neither the nation nor the state is organic. Therefore, the nation-
state is not organic either; instead, it is built by groups of people who 
make a conscious effort to define what the nation state is and is not. In 
the process, certain characteristics become a part of the national image 
while others are excluded from it. This is certainly the case for Colombia, 
which, despite gaining definitive independence from Spain in the 1820s, 
had consistently failed to establish a nation-state until after the separation 
of Panama in 1903.54 The loss Panama was largely an imperialist affront 
orchestrated by the United States. However, the fact that the idea 
resonated within the Panamanian elite so long after Colombia’s 
independence from Spain is further evidence of the Colombian nation-
state’s failure.  
Colombian historiography, even today, continues to victimize 
Colombia in 1903. The subsequent years, until 1921, are presented as a 
period in which the country had no choice but to seek the United States 
in order to ameliorate its economic problems. This narrative is 
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problematic because, in portraying Colombia as a victim, it obscures the 
fact that Panama’s separation facilitated the consolidation of power in 
Bogotá at the expense of other regions in the country. While it is true 
that losing Panama to unrestrained imperialism highlighted the absence 
of a strong nation-state, this phenomenon, in and of itself, is not 
necessarily a guarantee of future political unit. In Colombia’s case, 
Panama’s secession meant that the province that could rival Bogotá for 
control of the state was out of the union, effectively leaving the Andean 
capital as the unrivaled center of power in the country.  
Determined to not allow another secession to happen – an idea 
certainly entertained by other provinces – the government in Bogotá 
spearheaded a series of reforms meant to consolidate its power and 
dismantle the ever-disharmonious influence of regional concentrations of 
power. This change was further facilitated by the opening of the Panama 
Canal and the subsequent normalization of relations between the U.S. 
and Colombia by means of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty. These helped 
the Colombian state acquire the revenue necessary to build a modern 
state while altering the economic landscape of the country in a way that 
eased regional tensions between Bogotá and the rest of the republic. 
Colombia was the victim of empire; but its ruling class used the 
confusion that ensued to secure the nation-building project that it had 
been unable to maintain until then. Without Cartagena, without Caracas, 
and without Panama to resist, the Colombian nation-state was built from 
Bogotá. However, when the country as a whole is viewed as a victim, it is 
difficult to point to the actions of the central government as a steady 
effort to neutralize rivaling regions. Instead, the government’s actions are 
written into history as somewhat heroic, ignoring the fact that in the 
process of building a nation-state in the image of Bogotá, other regions in 
Colombia continue to be marginalized. 
Although American imperialist intervention as it regards 
Colombia and Panama has been amply discussed, the power shift that 
allowed the Bogotá elite to once and for all lead the nation-building 
project has not received much attention. Given the scope of American 
imperialism, this project may perhaps help raise questions about the 
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